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Agency Conflicts In Delegated Portfolio Management: Evidence From Namesake Mutual Funds

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  • Stephen P. Ferris
  • Xuemin (Sterling) Yan

Abstract

Namesake funds provide a unique sample for studying the two agency conflicts that exist within a mutual fund. The first is between the fund management company and fund shareholders, and the second is between the fund management company and the fund manager. A typical namesake fund manager sits on his or her fund's board, frequently as the chairman, is the majority owner of the fund management company, and has significant investments in the fund he or she manages. Our results indicate that namesake funds charge higher fees, suggesting that the boards of namesake funds are less effective. We find that namesake funds are more tax efficient, consistent with the idea that managerial ownership helps align the interests of managers with those of shareholders. Because of fewer career concerns, namesake fund managers herd less while assuming greater unsystematic risk. We find weak evidence that namesake fund managers outperform their benchmarks and peers. Finally, we observe that namesake funds attract higher levels of investor cash flow. 2007 The Southern Finance Association and the Southwestern Finance Association.

Suggested Citation

  • Stephen P. Ferris & Xuemin (Sterling) Yan, 2007. "Agency Conflicts In Delegated Portfolio Management: Evidence From Namesake Mutual Funds," Journal of Financial Research, Southern Finance Association;Southwestern Finance Association, vol. 30(4), pages 473-494.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:jfnres:v:30:y:2007:i:4:p:473-494
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    Cited by:

    1. repec:eee:finana:v:54:y:2017:i:c:p:63-75 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Sophie Xiaofei Kong & Dragon Yongjun Tang, 2008. "Unitary Boards And Mutual Fund Governance," Journal of Financial Research, Southern Finance Association;Southwestern Finance Association, vol. 31(3), pages 193-224.

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