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A Theory of Corporate Scope and Financial Structure

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  • Li, David D
  • Li, Shan

Abstract

The authors simultaneously address three basic issues regarding the corporation: the optimal scope of operation, the optimal financial structure, and the relationship between these two. The starting point is that financial structure serves as a bonding device on the managers' self-interest behavior. The effectiveness of this bonding depends on the distribution of the firm's future cash flow, which in turn depends on the firm's scope. The authors' theory also links the firm's investment decisions to its operation scope. As empirical implications, the theory reconciles the failure of the 1960s U.S. conglomerates with the success of the Japanese keiretsu. Copyright 1996 by American Finance Association.

Suggested Citation

  • Li, David D & Li, Shan, 1996. " A Theory of Corporate Scope and Financial Structure," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 51(2), pages 691-709, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:jfinan:v:51:y:1996:i:2:p:691-709
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    Cited by:

    1. Cerasi, Vittoria & Daltung, Sonja, 2001. "Diversification and Delegation in Firms," Working Paper Series 131, Sveriges Riksbank (Central Bank of Sweden).
    2. Prezas, Alexandros P., 2009. "Internal capital markets, empire building, and capital structure," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 61(3), pages 173-188.
    3. Akbel, Basak & Schnitzer, Monika, 2011. "Creditor rights and debt allocation within multinationals," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 35(6), pages 1367-1379, June.
    4. Cestone, Giacinta & Fumagalli, Chiara, 2001. "Internal Capital Markets, Cross-Subsidization and Product Market Competition," CEPR Discussion Papers 2935, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. Hamilton, Stephen F & Stiegert, Kyle, 2000. "Vertical Coordination, Antitrust Law, and International Trade," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 43(1), pages 143-156, April.
    6. Choi, Jongmoo Jay & Hiraki, Takato & Landi, James A., 2014. "The value of multinationality and business group for Japanese firms," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 29(C), pages 88-110.
    7. Boot, Arnoud W. A. & Schmeits, Anjolein, 2000. "Market Discipline and Incentive Problems in Conglomerate Firms with Applications to Banking," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 9(3), pages 240-273, July.
    8. Baule, Rainer, 2014. "Allocation of risk capital on an internal market," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 234(1), pages 186-196.
    9. Jean-Étienne Palard, 2007. "Recentrage stratégique et politique de financement:le cas des firmes cotées en Europe (1987-2003)," Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, revues.org, vol. 10(3), pages 111-137, September.
    10. Randall Morck & Bernard Yeung, 2017. "East Asian Financial and Economic Development," NBER Working Papers 23845, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    11. Aoun, Dany & Heshmati, Almas, 2006. "The Causal Relationship between Capital Structure and Cost of Capital: Evidence from ICT Companies Listed at NASDAQ," Ratio Working Papers 87, The Ratio Institute.
    12. Jacob A. Bikker, 2002. "Cross-sector diversification in financial conglomerates: simulations with a fair-value assets and liabilities model," BNL Quarterly Review, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, vol. 55(223), pages 363-389.
    13. Agarwal, Sumit & Chiu, I-Ming & Souphom, Victor & Yamashiro, Guy M., 2011. "The efficiency of internal capital markets: Evidence from the Annual Capital Expenditure Survey," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 162-172, May.
    14. Randall Morck & Bernard Yeung, 2017. "East Asian Financial and Economic Development," Working Papers id:12112, eSocialSciences.
    15. Ana Borges & João Correia-da-Silva & Didier Laussel, 2014. "Regulating a manager whose empire-building preferences are private information," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 111(2), pages 105-130, March.
    16. Kaufmann, Patrick J. & Gordon, Richard M. & Owers, James E., 2000. "Alternative Profitability Measures and Marketing Channel Structure: The Franchise Decision," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 217-224, November.
    17. R. Glenn Hubbard & Darius Palia, 1998. "A Re-Examination of the Conglomerate Merger Wave in the 1960s: An Internal Capital Markets View," NBER Working Papers 6539, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    18. Chou, Ting-Kai & Cheng, Jia-Chi, 2012. "Credit ratings and excess value of diversification," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 266-281.
    19. Ana Pinto Borges & João Correia‐Da‐Silva, 2011. "Using Cost Observation To Regulate A Manager Who Has A Preference For Empire‐Building," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 79(1), pages 29-44, January.
    20. Matsusaka, John G. & Nanda, Vikram, 2002. "Internal Capital Markets and Corporate Refocusing," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 176-211, April.
    21. Giacinta Cestone & Chiara Fumagalli, 2003. "Winner-Picking or Cross-Subsidization? The Strategic Impact of Resource Flexibility in Business Groups," CSEF Working Papers 93, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
    22. Singh, Manohar & Davidson, Wallace III & Suchard, Jo-Ann, 2003. "Corporate diversification strategies and capital structure," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 147-167.
    23. Stein, Jeremy C., 2003. "Agency, information and corporate investment," Handbook of the Economics of Finance,in: G.M. Constantinides & M. Harris & R. M. Stulz (ed.), Handbook of the Economics of Finance, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 2, pages 111-165 Elsevier.

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