IDEAS home Printed from
   My bibliography  Save this article

Corporate Capital Structure, Agency Costs, and Ownership Control: The Case of All-Equity Firms


  • Agrawal, Anup
  • Nagarajan, Nandu J


This paper provides evidence that all-equity firms exhibit greater levels of managerial stockholdings, more extensive family relationships among top management, and higher liquidity positions than a matched sample of levered firms. Further, top managers of all-equity firms with family involvement in corporate operations have greater control of corporate voting rights than managers of all-equity firms without family involvement. These findings are consistent with the interpretation that managerial control of voting rights and family relationships among senior managers are important factors in the decision to eliminate leverage. Copyright 1990 by American Finance Association.

Suggested Citation

  • Agrawal, Anup & Nagarajan, Nandu J, 1990. " Corporate Capital Structure, Agency Costs, and Ownership Control: The Case of All-Equity Firms," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 45(4), pages 1325-1331, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:jfinan:v:45:y:1990:i:4:p:1325-31

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL:
    File Function: full text
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to JSTOR subscribers. See for details.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.


    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.

    Cited by:

    1. repec:bbz:fcpbbr:v:11:y:2014:i:6:p:50-74 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Chan-Jane Lin & Tawei Wang & Chao-Jung Pan, 2016. "Financial reporting quality and investment decisions for family firms," Asia Pacific Journal of Management, Springer, vol. 33(2), pages 499-532, June.
    3. Wang, Daphne & Esqueda, Omar A., 2014. "National cultural effects on leverage decisions: Evidence from emerging-market ADRs," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 31(C), pages 152-177.
    4. Connelly, J. Thomas & Limpaphayom, Piman & Nagarajan, Nandu J., 2012. "Form versus substance: The effect of ownership structure and corporate governance on firm value in Thailand," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 36(6), pages 1722-1743.
    5. Rui Zhang & Xun Zhang, 2016. "Capital Structure Premium in Multinational SOEs: Evidence from China," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(1), pages 283-293, February.
    6. Shumi Akhtar & Barry Oliver, 2009. "Determinants of Capital Structure for Japanese Multinational and Domestic Corporations-super-," International Review of Finance, International Review of Finance Ltd., vol. 9(1-2), pages 1-26.
    7. Alex Bryson & Harald Dale-Olsen & Trygve Gulbrandsen, 2016. "Family ownership, Workplace Closure and the Recession," DoQSS Working Papers 16-06, Department of Quantitative Social Science - UCL Institute of Education, University College London.
    8. Mulyani, Evy & Singh, Harminder & Mishra, Sagarika, 2016. "Dividends, leverage, and family ownership in the emerging Indonesian market," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 16-29.
    9. Shumi Akhtar, 2005. "The Determinants of Capital Structure for Australian Multinational and Domestic Corporations," Australian Journal of Management, Australian School of Business, vol. 30(2), pages 321-341, December.
    10. repec:eee:reveco:v:51:y:2017:i:c:p:121-144 is not listed on IDEAS
    11. Yu, Chih-Ping, 2015. "Financial policies on firm performance: The U.S. insurance industry before and after the global financial crisis," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 391-402.
    12. Buchanan, Bonnie & Yang, Tina, 2005. "The benefits and costs of controlling shareholders: the rise and fall of Parmalat," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 27-52, March.
    13. Ebrahim, M. Shahid & Mathur, Ike, 2013. "On the efficiency of the UPREIT organizational form: Implications for the subprime crisis and CDO's," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 286-305.
    14. repec:eco:journ1:2017-04-71 is not listed on IDEAS
    15. Khan Shoaib & Suzuki Yasushi, 2016. "Ownership And Capital Structure Of Pakistani Non-Financial Firms," "e-Finanse", University of Information Technology and Management, Institute of Financial Research and Analysis, vol. 12(1), pages 57-67, June.
    16. Adam, Y.O. & Eltayeb, A.M., 2016. "Forestry decentralization and poverty alleviation: A review," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(C), pages 300-307.
    17. Devos, Erik & Dhillon, Upinder & Jagannathan, Murali & Krishnamurthy, Srinivasan, 2012. "Why are firms unlevered?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 18(3), pages 664-682.
    18. D'Mello, Ranjan & Gruskin, Mark, 2014. "Are the benefits of debt declining? The decreasing propensity of firms to be adequately levered," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 29(C), pages 327-350.
    19. Anderson, Ronald C & Reeb, David M, 2003. "Founding-Family Ownership, Corporate Diversification, and Firm Leverage," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 46(2), pages 653-684, October.
    20. Céspedes, Jacelly & González, Maximiliano & Molina, Carlos, 2008. "Ownership Concentration and the Determinants of Capital Structure in Latin America," Galeras. Working Papers Series 020, Universidad de Los Andes. Facultad de Administración. School of Management.
    21. Francesco Barbera & Ken Moores, 2013. "Firm ownership and productivity: a study of family and non-family SMEs," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 40(4), pages 953-976, May.

    More about this item


    Access and download statistics


    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:jfinan:v:45:y:1990:i:4:p:1325-31. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or (Christopher F. Baum). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.