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Spillover Effects of Monitoring: An Experiment on Lying

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  • Ninghua Du
  • Yi Yang

Abstract

We experimentally investigate the spillover effects of monitoring. In a controlled laboratory experiment, participants simultaneously self‐report their payoffs in two tasks. Holding lies in the untargeted task to never be penalized, we vary the observability and the punishment for lying in the targeted task as follows: (1) the experimenter cannot observe the random draw that determines the payoff the participant should report, (2) the experimenter observes the participants' random draw, and (3) a penalty is imposed on the participant if the self‐reported payoff and the random draw are not consistent. The results showed that while participants lied less in the targeted task given a higher level of monitoring, they significantly increased their lies in the untargeted task.

Suggested Citation

  • Ninghua Du & Yi Yang, 2026. "Spillover Effects of Monitoring: An Experiment on Lying," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(3), pages 526-537, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jemstr:v:35:y:2026:i:3:p:526-537
    DOI: 10.1111/jems.70014
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