Theoretical Foundations for Sticky Wages
The paper compares three different types of theoretical explanation of "sticky" wages. They are implicit contracts, efficiency wage models and insider/outsider models. It then reconsiders Keynes' rational for sticky wages, which focuses on relative wage issues. Finally, the paper considers possible directions for future research. Copyright 1990 by Blackwell Publishers Ltd
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Volume (Year): 4 (1990)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
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