The European Union in a Geo‐Economic World: Towards a New Inter‐Institutional Balance?

The EU's ‘geo‐economic turn’ has led to a blurring of the boundaries between EU trade and security policies. Against this background, this article examines whether a new institutional balance is emerging in the field of EU economic security policies, in particular, between the Commission, the Council and the European Parliament as the three principal EU institutions. Specifically, we look at the examples of the EU anti‐coercion instrument and the investment screening framework. Both instruments indicate a closer link between the areas of economic and security policy, which have traditionally been under the control of the Commission and the Council respectively. Using ‘institutional balance’ as a descriptive term for the balance of powers between the EU's institutions, we discuss how the right of initiative, co‐ordination procedures, decision‐making and implementation arrangements are organised in particular ways in both instruments. We find that a new institutional balance is emerging as a hybrid between the procedures prevalent in trade defence and sanctions, respectively. We explain this new institutional balance as the outcome of different institutional interests of the key actors, moderated by the existing legal and procedural context at EU and global level. The emerging institutional arrangements are difficult to qualify as clearly ‘intergovernmental’ or ‘supranational’. Elements of centralisation co‐exist with pockets of national control and co‐ordination requirements between the different levels. Bargaining between the key actors is driven not only by institutional self‐interests but also by considerations of strengthening the EU's resilience in a geo‐economic environment.