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Coalition‐Sensitive Voting Power in the Council of Ministers: The Case of Eastern Enlargement

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  • G. Michael Winkler

Abstract

The Shapley value is used to analyse the distribution of voting power for qualified majority decisions in the EU Council. Coalition‐neutral and coalition‐sensitive voting power are distinguished. In large unions such as the current Union of the Fifteen, the distribution of coalition‐neutral voting power almost coincides with the distribution of votes, whereas the coalition‐sensitive voting power of a Member State may deviate considerably from its share of votes and react strongly to small changes in circumstances. The case of eastern enlargement of the Union is used to demonstrate that coalition‐sensitive voting power appropriately exhibits the Member States’ influence in the Council.

Suggested Citation

  • G. Michael Winkler, 1998. "Coalition‐Sensitive Voting Power in the Council of Ministers: The Case of Eastern Enlargement," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(3), pages 391-404, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jcmkts:v:36:y:1998:i:3:p:391-404
    DOI: 10.1111/1468-5965.00116
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    Cited by:

    1. Matthias Sutter, 2000. "Fair Allocation and Re-Weighting of Votes and Voting Power in the EU before and after the Next Enlargement," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 12(4), pages 433-449, October.
    2. Sutter, Matthias, 2000. "Flexible Integration, EMU and Relative Voting Power in the EU," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 104(1-2), pages 41-62, July.

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