IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/jbfnac/v52y2025i2p892-922.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Do politically connected subsidy recipients disclose less subsidy information?

Author

Listed:
  • Ningzhong Li
  • Youchao Tan
  • Cheng Zeng

Abstract

This paper examines the association between firms’ political connections and their voluntary disclosure of information related to government subsidies, using a sample of Chinese non‐state‐owned enterprises. We find that politically connected subsidy recipients disclose less information about their subsidies (source and policy basis) in their annual reports than do unconnected firms. This association is mainly driven by connected firms whose subsidies are difficult to justify and are stronger for firms registered in more corrupt provinces and firms with higher media attention. In addition, connected firms disclosing more subsidy information receive fewer future subsidies than do other connected firms. These findings suggest that politically connected subsidy recipients tend to withhold subsidy information to reduce the costs that accompany public scrutiny of subsidies granted through relationships.

Suggested Citation

  • Ningzhong Li & Youchao Tan & Cheng Zeng, 2025. "Do politically connected subsidy recipients disclose less subsidy information?," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 52(2), pages 892-922, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jbfnac:v:52:y:2025:i:2:p:892-922
    DOI: 10.1111/jbfa.12829
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/jbfa.12829
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/jbfa.12829?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:jbfnac:v:52:y:2025:i:2:p:892-922. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0306-686X .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.