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Political contributions and the auditor–client relationship

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  • Frank Heflin
  • Dana Wallace

Abstract

We investigate the impact of audit client political contributions on various audit attributes. We find that, despite having poorer accruals quality, clients with higher political contributions have fewer restatements, receive no more going concern qualified opinions and receive fewer reported material weaknesses. Additionally, we find that auditors earn higher fees from and have longer tenure with their politically connected clients. Our evidence is indirect, but the totality of our results is most consistent with an economic bond between auditors and their politically connected clients, whereby clients are allowed more accounting discretion and receive fewer adverse audit outcomes, and the auditor charges a persistent risk premium. We conclude that client political connections likely influence audit outcomes because of either reduced scrutiny from regulators or direct influence on auditors. We extend a growing body of research on the consequences of corporate political connections.

Suggested Citation

  • Frank Heflin & Dana Wallace, 2024. "Political contributions and the auditor–client relationship," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(9-10), pages 2668-2708, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jbfnac:v:51:y:2024:i:9-10:p:2668-2708
    DOI: 10.1111/jbfa.12791
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