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Directors’ and officers’ liability insurance and corporate cash holdings: From principal–principal perspective

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Listed:
  • Quanxi Liang
  • Wenlian Gao
  • Lijuan Yan

Abstract

This study examines the effect of directors’ and officers’ liability insurance (D&O insurance) on corporate cash holdings in China. We propose a collusion theory in which D&O insurance can exacerbate the conflicts of interest between controlling and minority shareholders by shielding directors and officers from shareholder litigation in emerging countries. Consistent with our expectation, we find that insured firms tend to have high cash holdings that are appropriated by both controlling shareholders and directors/officers rather than being invested or paid to shareholders. Moreover, the positive relationship between D&O insurance and cash holdings is more pronounced in firms with high litigation risks, whereas the effect is attenuated in firms with political connections, strong external monitoring mechanisms and strong controlling shareholder power. Compared with uninsured firms, the market discounts the value of cash holdings for insured firms.

Suggested Citation

  • Quanxi Liang & Wenlian Gao & Lijuan Yan, 2024. "Directors’ and officers’ liability insurance and corporate cash holdings: From principal–principal perspective," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(5-6), pages 1432-1466, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jbfnac:v:51:y:2024:i:5-6:p:1432-1466
    DOI: 10.1111/jbfa.12752
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