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Information Disclosure to Employees and Rational Expectations: a Game‐Theoretical Perspective: a Comment

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  • Peter F., David A. Pope Peel

Abstract

In this comment we identify the key features of the Frantz and Walker (1997) game theoretic model that drive the non‐disclosure equilibrium result in their paper. We argue that, although technically correct, their model fails to capture certain aspects of real‐world wage bargaining that will be important in determining optimal disclosure strategies in practice. However, Frantz and Walker's paper illustrates the potential of analytical techniques to contribute to the employee disclosure debate.

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  • Peter F., David A. Pope Peel, 1997. "Information Disclosure to Employees and Rational Expectations: a Game‐Theoretical Perspective: a Comment," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 24(9‐10), pages 1433-1435, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jbfnac:v:24:y:1997:i:9-10:p:1433-1435
    DOI: 10.1111/1468-5957.t01-1-00172
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