Formulaic Transparency: The Hidden Enabler of Exceptional U.S. Securitization

Why does the securitization of residential mortgages, credit cards, auto loans, and other such consumer debt in the U.S. exceed the securitization of such debt in Europe by several trillion dollars? The author points out that lemon problems do not stop the sale of used cars but they do prevent the operation of a market in which buyers place sight†unseen bids for used cars offered by unknown sellers. Buyers prefer to know who the seller is and test†drive vehicles. Similarly until the 1980s, creditors were willing to forgo the information they could secure in private transactions to get tradability mainly in the case of bonds issued by governments or a few blue†chip companies. U.S. government policy encouraged the securitization of trillions of dollars of loans made to millions of borrowers. U.S. rules—rather than new financial or information technologies—have strongly encouraged originators of mortgages and other consumer loans to rely on credit scores (commonly referred to as FICO scores) produced by credit bureaus. And reliance on scores that loan originators use but don’t produce helps overcome the information asymmetry problems that would otherwise constrain securitization. The argument turns the usual concern about securitization on its head: transferring risks to investors is normally expected to discourage careful screening of borrowers, but the author’s analysis suggests that formulaic, FICO†based screening actually enables risk transfer by reducing information asymmetry problems. Moreover, while limiting screening reduces the upfront costs of lending, it also increases loans made to uncreditworthy borrowers. And because increasing loans made to bad borrowers raises the rates good borrowers have to pay (to compensate investors for higher defaults), U.S. rules that sacrifice information for more “complete†markets may be a bad bargain.