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Managerial Ownership and Agency Conflicts: A Nonlinear Simultaneous Equation Analysis of Managerial Ownership, Risk Taking, Debt Policy, and Dividend Policy

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  • Chen, Carl R
  • Steiner, Thomas L

Abstract

This paper uses a nonlinear simultaneous equation methodology to examine how managerial ownership relates to risk taking, debt policy, and dividend policy. The results have implications for our understanding of agency costs. We find risk to be a significant and positive determinant of the level of managerial ownership while managerial ownership is also a significant and positive determinant of the level of risk. The result supports the argument that managerial ownership helps to resolve the agency conflicts between external stockholders and managers but at the expense of exacerbating the agency conflict between stockholders and bondholders. We further observe evidence of substitution-monitoring effects between managerial ownership and debt policy, between managerial ownership and dividend policy, and between managerial ownership and institutional ownership. Copyright 1999 by MIT Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Chen, Carl R & Steiner, Thomas L, 1999. "Managerial Ownership and Agency Conflicts: A Nonlinear Simultaneous Equation Analysis of Managerial Ownership, Risk Taking, Debt Policy, and Dividend Policy," The Financial Review, Eastern Finance Association, vol. 34(1), pages 119-136, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:finrev:v:34:y:1999:i:1:p:119-36
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    Cited by:

    1. Jorge Farinha & Oscar Lopez-de-Foronda, 2009. "The relation between dividends and insider ownership in different legal systems: international evidence," The European Journal of Finance, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 15(2), pages 169-189.
    2. Lee, Cheng-Few & Kuo, Nan-Ting, 2014. "Effects of ultimate ownership structure and corporate tax on capital structures: Evidence from Taiwan," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 29(C), pages 409-425.
    3. Chen, Zhilan & Cheung, Yan-Leung & Stouraitis, Aris & Wong, Anita W.S., 2005. "Ownership concentration, firm performance, and dividend policy in Hong Kong," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 13(4), pages 431-449, September.
    4. Darakhshan Younis & Attiya Yasmin Javid, 2014. "Market Imperfections and Dividend Policy Decisions of Manufacturing Sector of Pakistan," PIDE-Working Papers 2014:99, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics.
    5. Chen, Yenn-Ru & Lee, Bong Soo, 2010. "A dynamic analysis of executive stock options: Determinants and consequences," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 88-103, February.
    6. repec:vul:omefvu:v:8:y:2017:i:1:id:218 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Bany-Ariffin, A.N. & Mat Nor, Fauzias & McGowan Jr., Carl B., 2010. "Pyramidal structure, firm capital structure exploitation and ultimate owners' dominance," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 151-164, June.
    8. Elsayed, Khaled & Wahba, Hayam, 2013. "Reinvestigating the relationship between ownership structure and inventory management: A corporate governanceperspective," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 143(1), pages 207-218.
    9. Yoshikatsu Shinozawa, 2007. "The Effect of Organisational Form on Investment Products: an empirical analysis of the UK unit trust industry," Corporate Governance: An International Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(6), pages 1244-1259, November.
    10. Gehan A. Mousa & Abdelmohsen M. Desoky & Zuraidah Mohd Sanusi, 2012. "The Association Between Internal Governance Mechanisms And Corporate Value: Evidence From Bahrain," Asian Academy of Management Journal of Accounting and Finance (AAMJAF), Penerbit Universiti Sains Malaysia, vol. 8(Supp. 1), pages 67-91.
    11. Crutchley, Claire E. & Jensen, Marlin R. H. & JaheraJr., John S. & Raymond, Jennie E., 1999. "Agency problems and the simultaneity of financial decision making: The role of institutional ownership," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 8(2), pages 177-197, June.
    12. Mauricio Jara-Bertin & Félix J. López-Iturriaga & Ãscar López-de-Foronda, 2008. "The Contest to the Control in European Family Firms: How Other Shareholders Affect Firm Value," Corporate Governance: An International Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(3), pages 146-159, May.
    13. Jonchi Shyu, 2011. "Family ownership and firm performance: evidence from Taiwanese firms," International Journal of Managerial Finance, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 7(4), pages 397-411, September.
    14. Haleem, Fazli & Javid, Attiya Yasmin, 2011. "Modeling Dividend Behavior in Pakistan," MPRA Paper 37564, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    15. A Cosh & P Guest & A Hughes, 2001. "Managerial Discretion and Takeover Performance," Working Papers wp216, Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge.
    16. repec:eee:finana:v:52:y:2017:i:c:p:38-48 is not listed on IDEAS
    17. Duha Al-Kuwari, 2012. "Are Large Shareholders Conducting Influential Monitoring in Emerging Markets? An Investigation into the Impact of Large Shareholders on Dividend Decisions: The Case of Kuwait," Research in World Economy, Research in World Economy, Sciedu Press, vol. 3(2), pages 52-67, September.
    18. Jabbouri, Imad, 2016. "Determinants of corporate dividend policy in emerging markets: Evidence from MENA stock markets," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 283-298.
    19. Wu, Hsueh-Liang, 2008. "When does internal governance make firms innovative," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 141-153, February.
    20. Florackis, Chris & Kanas, Angelos & Kostakis, Alexandros, 2015. "Dividend policy, managerial ownership and debt financing: A non-parametric perspective," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 241(3), pages 783-795.

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