An Empirical Analysis of the Political Economy of Tariffs
We seek to analyze the determinants of senatorial response to "generic" trade bills that seek to impose restrictions on the lowering of tariffs. The analysis is based on the response of senators to the trade expansion acts of 1962 and 1974. In the recent past these have been the only bills that are "generic" in nature since they are not targeted at any particular industry. Within the same framework we also examine the issue of "legislator shirking", a term used to imply the response of senators based on pure personal ideology rather than the interests of the constituents. Regression results show the growing influence of state specific factors and the diminishing role of party and personal ideology on senatorial response. Interestingly, we find that despite the similar generic nature of the two bills examined, the influence of personal ideology on the response of senators varies across the two bills examined. Copyright 1997 Blackwell Publishers Ltd..
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Volume (Year): 9 (1997)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
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