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Measuring The Deadweight Costs Of Dup And Rent Seeking Activities

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  • Hal R. Varian

Abstract

I examine a simple model of rent seeking behavior in order to determine the correct way to measure welfare loss due to rent seeking. I conduct this analysis using a general equilibrium version of the standard partial equilibrium consumers' surplus cost‐benefit setup. I conclude that the ordinary tools of cost‐benefit analysis, such as consumers' and producers' surplus, are up to the task of measuring the deadweight loss due to rent seeking, as long as they are applied in the proper general equilibrium context.

Suggested Citation

  • Hal R. Varian, 1989. "Measuring The Deadweight Costs Of Dup And Rent Seeking Activities," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 1(1), pages 81-95, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:1:y:1989:i:1:p:81-95
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0343.1989.tb00006.x
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    Cited by:

    1. Jac C. Heckelman & Bonnie Wilson, 2013. "Institutions, Lobbying, and Economic Performance," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(3), pages 360-386, November.
    2. Bartsch, Elga & Thomas, Ingo P. & Rauscher, Michael, 1993. "Environmental legislation and the impact of lobbying activities," Kiel Working Papers 562, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    3. Laussel, Didier & Le Breton, Michel, 2001. "Conflict and Cooperation: The Structure of Equilibrium Payoffs in Common Agency," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 100(1), pages 93-128, September.
    4. Murray C. Kemp & Hans-Werner Sinn, 1990. "A Simple Model of Useless Speculation," NBER Working Papers 3513, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Sadoulet, Elisabeth, 1994. "Political Constraints on the Developmental State: Alternative Theoretical Explanations," CUDARE Working Papers 201466, University of California, Berkeley, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics.
    6. Nitzan, Shmuel, 1991. "Collective Rent Dissipation," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 101(409), pages 1522-1534, November.
    7. J.A. den Hertog, 2010. "Review of economic theories of regulation," Working Papers 10-18, Utrecht School of Economics.
    8. Latkov, Andrey, 2014. "Trends of Rent-seeking Theory," MPRA Paper 62864, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Leo H. Kahane, 2002. "Rice, Salmon or Sushi? Political Competition for Supply of a Regulated Input," The American Economist, Sage Publications, vol. 46(1), pages 22-28, March.
    10. Mushtaq H. Khan, 1996. "The efficiency implications of corruption," Journal of International Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 8(5), pages 683-696.
    11. Jiancai Pi & Shuxi Duan, 2023. "Appropriation, migration, and unemployment," Australian Economic Papers, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 62(3), pages 430-456, September.

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