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Costly Information Acquisition and Delegation to a “Liberal” Central Banker

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  • Johan Lagerlöf

Abstract

This paper develops a model of monetary policy in which the central banker can acquire costly information about a supply shock. It is shown that, with this assumption, it may be optimal for society to delegate to a “weight‐liberal” central banker, a result which contrasts with that of Rogoff (1985). This result points at a limitation of Rogoff's argument. It may also explain why the issue of delegating monetary policy to an independent and “weight‐conservative” central banker often is politically controversial.

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  • Johan Lagerlöf, 2001. "Costly Information Acquisition and Delegation to a “Liberal” Central Banker," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(3), pages 221-236, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:13:y:2001:i:3:p:221-236
    DOI: 10.1111/1468-0343.00091
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    Cited by:

    1. Johan Lagerlöf, 2004. "Are We Better Off if Our Politicians Have More Information?," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 106(1), pages 123-142, March.

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