A call to embrace jural dualism

This article explores concepts under a rubric termed ‘jural’, the meaning of which is differentiated from ‘legal’. Within the conceptualisation of the modern nation state, there are two categories of jural relationships. In the first, both parties have equal jural standing (equal–equal), as between neighbours. In the second jural relationship (superior–inferior), one party has standing as a special jural player, essentially the governor. The jural superior wields the coercive powers of government. Human beings, we argue, are predisposed to folding this jural superior back into the equal–equal relationship, thus notionally collapsing two relationships back to one, or collapsing from jural dualism into jural monism. Two varieties of the tendency stand out, namely collectivist thinking that sees government as a set of rules and arrangements arrived at voluntarily, and Rothbardian libertarianism that sees government as a criminal organisation and proposes its elimination. But, beyond those two varieties, we see traces and tinctures of the tendency towards jural monism. We call for a conscious embrace of jural dualism.