IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/ecaffa/v26y2006i1p61-64.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The Political Economy Of Overlapping Jurisdictions And The French/Dutch Rejection Of The Eu Constitution

Author

Listed:
  • Jean‐Luc Migué

Abstract

In seeking to protect their failed social model by rejecting the EU constitution, French and Dutch voters ironically contributed to promoting the very ‘liberal’ order they misunderstand and despise. When, as in federalist politics, functions overlap, two levels of government compete for the same votes in the same territory in the supply of similar services. Not unlike the tragedy of the commons in oil extraction, it is in the interest of both political authorities to seek to gain votes in implementing the programme first. The overall equilibrium supply of public services is excessive and both levels of government have a tendency to invade every field. Short of effective constitutional limits on the powers of the central government, a more decentralised EU offers an opportunity to overcome the common‐pool problem of multi‐level government.

Suggested Citation

  • Jean‐Luc Migué, 2006. "The Political Economy Of Overlapping Jurisdictions And The French/Dutch Rejection Of The Eu Constitution," Economic Affairs, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 26(1), pages 61-64, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecaffa:v:26:y:2006:i:1:p:61-64
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0270.2006.00613.x
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0270.2006.00613.x
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/j.1468-0270.2006.00613.x?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:ecaffa:v:26:y:2006:i:1:p:61-64. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0265-0665 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.