Croatia's transition from aid recipient to donor: Building a small‐donor development policy under EU and OECD‐DAC norms

Motivation Small post‐recipient donor states face increasing pressure to professionalize international development cooperation while simultaneously responding to crisis‐driven humanitarian and geopolitical demands. Croatia's rapid transition from EU accession in 2013 to donor status offers a revealing case for examining how such states institutionalize development cooperation under EU and OECD‐DAC norms in a context of sustained neighbourhood shocks. Purpose This article examines how Croatia has institutionalized its international development cooperation since becoming a donor and assesses whether its emerging donor profile aligns with EU/OECD‐DAC expectations while effectively operationalizing a declared transition and post‐conflict niche. Approach and methods The study employs a mixed‐methods case study design combining thematic analysis of Croatian international development cooperation legislation and strategies, descriptive analysis of official development assistance trends from 2013 to 2024, and systematic coding of Croatia's bilateral project portfolio for 2020–2024. Findings The analysis shows that Croatia's ODA expanded rapidly after 2021, reaching 0.21% of GNI in 2023 and 0.22% in 2024, while remaining heavily concentrated in the Western Balkans and Ukraine. Five‐year portfolio analysis (2020–2024) shows a dual‐track pattern: a structurally Bosnia‐and‐Herzegovina‐centred Western Balkans portfolio and a crisis‐driven Ukraine portfolio. In the Western Balkans, education/culture and healthcare dominate financial allocations, while peace, security, and governance grew from EUR 165,000 in 2020 to EUR 1.9 million in 2024, indicating an emerging but still modest niche‐relevant category. More broadly, peace, security, and post‐conflict assistance had become financially substantial by 2024 when Ukraine‐related support is included. Although Croatia consistently frames transition experience—such as post‐conflict recovery, demining, and EU‐accession know‐how—as its comparative advantage, nationally recorded technical‐assistance accounts for less than 1% of total ODA. This outcome is driven by fragmented coordination, issues with recording of aid, and overreliance on EU instruments such as Twinning and TAIEX, rather than by an absence of expertise provision. Policy implications The findings suggest that Croatia's next convergence step as a small donor depends less on redefining its strategic priorities than on strengthening governance and measurement capacities. Modest system‐wide reforms, such as unified national international development cooperation registries, mandatory strategic tagging, light results frameworks, and system‐wide reporting training, offer a more realistic and effective pathway to enhancing DAC credibility and niche visibility under crisis conditions than premature agency‐style institutional redesign.