Author
Abstract
Motivation This study examines how donors provide aid to unrecognized government under restricted conditions, focusing on Afghanistan's Taliban government, which has ruled since August 2021. However, owing to its harsh policies, particularly towards women, no country or organization has officially recognized it as a government, placing strong constraints on foreign aid to Afghanistan. Nevertheless, donors continue to provide aid because it is difficult to halt assistance on humanitarian grounds. Purpose Aiding unrecognized states (governments) is fraught with difficulties. Using the example of Afghanistan under the rule of the Taliban in the 1990s and from August 2021 to the present, this paper clarifies that the political situation of unrecognition imposes enormous costs on both the recipient and donor sides of aid. Approach and methods The study reviews reports from the United Nations and other organizations, academic literature, and media articles. In addition, informal in‐person and remote interviews are conducted with stakeholders in the government, academia, research institutes in the United States and the United Kingdom, Japan, aid workers in Kabul, Afghanistan, and an Afghan immigrant in Canada. Findings Aid to an unrecognized government causes a paradox in efforts to provide more aid, with higher procedural costs and the need for deeper communication with the unrecognized government. Furthermore, “aid diversion,” or aid flows to unrecognized governments, remains a controversial issue in US domestic politics. Policy implications Even if donors are highly motivated to provide aid to unrecognized governments for humanitarian and developmental reasons, diplomatic non‐recognition impedes and creates dilemmas in aid delivery. Hence, donors face high procedural costs or have to make compromises in aiding politically unrecognized de facto governments. The US and other countries are not expected to recognize the Taliban diplomatically for a while, although the suffering Afghan people need aid. A realistic approach would be to provide de facto development assistance under the cover of humanitarian assistance and to continue dialogue with the Taliban, thereby developing mutual interests and trust.
Suggested Citation
Haruyuki Shimada, 2025.
"Aid paradox for unrecognized governments: The Taliban and aid,"
Development Policy Review, Overseas Development Institute, vol. 43(3), May.
Handle:
RePEc:bla:devpol:v:43:y:2025:i:3:n:e70008
DOI: 10.1111/dpr.70008
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