IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/buecrs/v71y2019i3p508-516.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Free Versus Second‐Best Entry In Cournot Oligopolies With Firm‐Specific Networks

Author

Listed:
  • Adriana Gama

Abstract

This paper endogenizes the number of firms in an industry with positive network effects, complete incompatibility, and firms that compete in quantity. To this end, we compare two possibilities: free entry and second‐best number of firms (the one that maximizes social welfare). We show that with business‐stealing competition, free entry yields, in general, more firms than the socially optimal solution. In addition, we find that by the nature of the industry with firm‐specific networks, total production may be greater or lower under free entry than with a regulator; moreover, some industries attain their maximum social welfare with a monopoly.

Suggested Citation

  • Adriana Gama, 2019. "Free Versus Second‐Best Entry In Cournot Oligopolies With Firm‐Specific Networks," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 71(3), pages 508-516, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:buecrs:v:71:y:2019:i:3:p:508-516
    DOI: 10.1111/boer.12192
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/boer.12192
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/boer.12192?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Marco de Pinto & Laszlo Goerke & Alberto Palermo, 2024. "Business Stealing + Economic Rent = Insufficient Entry? An Integrative Framework," IAAEU Discussion Papers 202402, Institute of Labour Law and Industrial Relations in the European Union (IAAEU).

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:buecrs:v:71:y:2019:i:3:p:508-516. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0307-3378 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.