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Subsidies As Optimal Fiscal Stimuli

Author

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  • Hassan Molana
  • Catia Montagna
  • Chang Yee Kwan

Abstract

In the theoretical macroeconomics literature, fiscal policy is almost uniformly taken to mean taxing and spending by a ‘benevolent government’ that exploits the potential aggregate demand externalities inherent in the imperfectly competitive nature of goods markets. Whilst shown to raise aggregate output and employment, these policies crowd-out private consumption and hence typically reduce welfare. In this paper we consider the use of ‘tax-and-subsidise’ instead of ‘taxand- spend’ policies on account of their widespread use by governments, even in the recent recession, to stimulate economic activity. Within a static general equilibrium macro-model with imperfectly competitive good markets we examine the effect of wage and output subsidies and show that, for a small open economy, positive tax and subsidy rates exist which maximise welfare, rendering no intervention as a suboptimal state. We also show that, within a two-country setting, a Nash non-cooperative symmetric equilibrium with positive tax and subsidy rates exists, and that cooperation between trading partners in setting these rates is more expansionary and leads to an improvement upon the non-cooperative solution.
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Suggested Citation

  • Hassan Molana & Catia Montagna & Chang Yee Kwan, 2012. "Subsidies As Optimal Fiscal Stimuli," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 64(Supplemen), pages 149-167, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:buecrs:v:64:y:2012:i:s1:p:s149-s167
    DOI: j.1467-8586.2012.00460.x
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    Cited by:

    1. Hassan Molana & Catia Montagna, 2018. "Competitive selection, trade, and employment: The strategic use of subsidies," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 26(5), pages 1154-1177, November.
    2. Hassan Molana & Catia Montagna, 2016. "Selection, Trade, and Employment: The Strategic Use of Subsidies," Dundee Discussion Papers in Economics 296, Economic Studies, University of Dundee.
    3. Hassan Molana, 2015. "Selection, Trade, and Employment: the Strategic Use of Subsidies. WWWforEurope Policy Paper No. 21," WIFO Studies, WIFO, number 57894.
    4. Cheng-wei Chang & Ching-chong Lai & Ting-wei Lai, 2020. "Fiscal stimulus in a simple macroeconomic model of monopolistic competition with firm heterogeneity," The Japanese Economic Review, Springer, vol. 71(3), pages 447-477, July.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E6 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook
    • F1 - International Economics - - Trade
    • H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue

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