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Risk Aversion and the Full-Costs of Rent-Seeking

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  • Allard, Richard J

Abstract

Risk aversion is frequently postulated as one of the factors that lead to under-dissipation of rents. However, the formal analyses which have supported this contention and suggested that the effects can be large have focused solely on the expenditures of contestants, ignoring the associated costs of risk. The paper argues that this omission is wrong in principle, and that when corrected the presence of risk aversion in fact leads to substantial increases in the extent of rent dissipation, although an exception is when there is a very strong combination of risk aversion and asymmetry. Copyright 1999 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd and the Board of Trustees of the Bulletin of Economic Research

Suggested Citation

  • Allard, Richard J, 1999. "Risk Aversion and the Full-Costs of Rent-Seeking," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(2), pages 95-109, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:buecrs:v:51:y:1999:i:2:p:95-109
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    Cited by:

    1. Lisa Anderson & Beth Freeborn, 2010. "Varying the intensity of competition in a multiple prize rent seeking experiment," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 143(1), pages 237-254, April.
    2. Jean-Daniel Guigou & Bruno Lovat & Marc Boissaux, 2013. "Asymmetric contests with risky rents," DEM Discussion Paper Series 13-9, Department of Economics at the University of Luxembourg.
    3. Jean-Daniel Guigou & Bruno Lovat & Marc Boissaux, 2013. "Asymmetric contests with risky rents," LSF Research Working Paper Series 13-9, Luxembourg School of Finance, University of Luxembourg.

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