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Learning-by-Doing and Asymmetric Information in a Model of Monopoly Regulation

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  • Wright, Donald J

Abstract

This paper combines learning-by-doing and asymmetric information in a model of monopoly regulation with and without foreign competition. The principal source of the information asymmetry is unobservable firm effort in the learning process, although unobservable costs are also considered. The major result is that a post-learning all-or-nothing output-contingent lump-sum subsidy can achieve the regulator's complete information welfare maximum. With foreign competition this model can best be thought of as one involving infant industry regulation. Copyright 1995 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd and the Board of Trustees of the Bulletin of Economic Research

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  • Wright, Donald J, 1995. "Learning-by-Doing and Asymmetric Information in a Model of Monopoly Regulation," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(1), pages 39-53, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:buecrs:v:47:y:1995:i:1:p:39-53
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