IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/ajecsc/v84y2025i5p671-682.html

Environmental R&D Risk Choices and Environmental Policies in a Mixed Duopoly

Author

Listed:
  • Weiwei Zhang
  • Hui Li
  • Dongdong Li

Abstract

This paper investigates how environmental policies—emission tax and emission standard—affect the optimal environmental R&D (ER&D) risk choices of firms in a mixed market. The results show that for the private firm, ER&D risk is lower (higher) under the emission tax than under the emission standard when consumer environmental awareness is low (high). For the public firm, ER&D risk is always higher under the emission tax than under the emission standard. We also show that a privatization policy always decreases the ER&D risk of the public firm but is likely to increase the ER&D risk of the private firm. Finally, we find that the private firm faces considerable welfare risk when consumer environmental awareness is high under the emission tax. However, the private firm's incentive for ER&D risk is always lower than the social incentive under the emission standard.

Suggested Citation

  • Weiwei Zhang & Hui Li & Dongdong Li, 2025. "Environmental R&D Risk Choices and Environmental Policies in a Mixed Duopoly," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 84(5), pages 671-682, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ajecsc:v:84:y:2025:i:5:p:671-682
    DOI: 10.1111/ajes.12624
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/ajes.12624
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/ajes.12624?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:ajecsc:v:84:y:2025:i:5:p:671-682. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0002-9246 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.