Not Commodities, but Living Beings: A Critique of Animal Commodification

The fundamental question underlying this paper is: should we treat animals as commodities? This inquiry challenges the assumption that animals should be downgraded to lifeless objects or goods to be valued solely for human benefit. At the heart of this issue lies a profound contradiction: animals are living beings capable of experiencing pain, pleasure, and, in many cases, complex social and emotional experiences. Yet, within systems of commodification, they are reduced to economic units, valued for their capacity to produce profit—whether as food or emotional companionship. This dysfunctional attitude obscures their intrinsic worth and the ethical responsibilities humans have toward sentient beings. This article provides arguments against animal exploitation and commodification, drawing on concepts belonging to Marxist theory such as metabolic rift and robbery of nature. In addition to Marx, I will mainly refer to Nancy Fraser, Kohei Saito, and John Bellamy Foster. Although these theorists refer more to the natural environment in general than specifically to animals, by connecting these reflections to traditional theories of animal ethics, we can observe more clearly the impact that capitalism and commodification have on animal welfare, as those systems deprive animals of their autonomy and reduce their lives to cycles of exploitation and death.