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Natural Monopolies and Rent: A Georgist Remedy for X‐Inefficiency Among Publicly‐regulated Firms

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  • George Babilot
  • Roger Frantz
  • Louis Green

Abstract

. Publicly‐regulated firms are sheltered from competition and are inefficient. When analyzed within the theoretical framework of X‐inefficiency, it is discovered that they are subsidized by a quasi excise tax and result in deadweight losses to society. When the losses and X‐inefficiency are understood as rent, an appropriate public policy is to levy a tax on these firms. A tax would raise productivity and increase tax revenues without reducing output.

Suggested Citation

  • George Babilot & Roger Frantz & Louis Green, 1987. "Natural Monopolies and Rent: A Georgist Remedy for X‐Inefficiency Among Publicly‐regulated Firms," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(2), pages 205-217, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ajecsc:v:46:y:1987:i:2:p:205-217
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1536-7150.1987.tb01956.x
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