Radical Individualism vs. Institutionalism, I The Division of Institutionalists into ‘Humanists’ and ‘Behaviorists’

. David Seckler has filled an important gap in the methodological literature of economics by providing a “radical individualist” critique of American institutionalism (1). Seckler argues that institutionalists have been unable to develop a coherent methodology because of their ambivalence on the issue of “free will versus determinism.” Thorstein Veblen, he says, entertained both “humanistic” and “behavioristic” hypotheses in his explanations of human behavior and, consequently, descended into obscurantism. The institutionalist literature in general reflects these contradictory methodological tendencies; for example, John R. Commons was a “humanist”, whereas Clarence Ayres was a “behaviorist.” Seckler's critique is not, however, persuasive. He fails to recognize the difficulties inherent in the philosophical dualisms posited by “radical individualism,” and he employs them credulously in his critique of institutionalism. Equally damaging to his argument is his failure to give adequate consideration to the meaning and significance of the “institutional dichotomy” in institutional analysis.