Controlling Shareholder Share Pledging and Corporate Social Security Contributions in China

This study investigates the impact of controlling shareholder share pledging on corporate social security contributions in China. Employing a fixed effects model, instrumental variables, the propensity score matching (PSM‐DID) method, and the difference‐in‐differences (DID) method, we find that controlling shareholder share pledging has a negative impact on corporate social security contributions in China, and when the controlling shareholders face a higher risk of losing control rights, they are more likely to evade social security contributions. Also, we conduct a series of robustness checks and rule out financial constraints, shareholder tunnelling, and agent costs as alternative explanations to prove the conclusion credible. Moreover, we find that employee bargaining power could weaken the negative effect of controlling shareholder share pledging on corporate social security contributions. Further, our analysis indicates that social security contributions evasion could reduce firms' labour productivity. These findings indicate that although the evasion of social security contributions is conducive to saving cash outflows, it exerts a harmful influence on enterprise labour productivity.