IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/abacus/v61y2025i2p498-553.html

The Accountability System for Material Misstatements and Executive Pay Performance Sensitivity: A Quasi‐natural Experiment

Author

Listed:
  • Wenjun Liu
  • Qian He
  • June Cao

Abstract

This study examines the impact of the accountability system for material misstatements (ASMM) on the sensitivity of executive compensation to accounting earnings in China. Using a difference‐in‐differences model, we find that the ASMM significantly decreases the sensitivity of executive compensation to accounting earnings, which we attribute to the monitoring and unintended effects of the ASMM. As executives’ cost to manage reported earnings for more bonuses is significantly heightened by the ASMM, their high compensation sensitivity to reported earnings, which contain earnings management, reduces. The unintended consequence is that executives’ risk aversion is also incentivized to preserve performance pay while the ASMM restricts earnings management, and boards reduce executives’ compensation sensitivity to accounting earnings to encourage their risk taking. These phenomena are more pronounced in companies with high agency conflict, audited by non‐Big 4 auditors, and less followed by analysts. The results indicate that corporate governance reforms that introduce personal responsibilities in China can improve the accuracy of accounting earnings but decrease the efficiency of assessing executive hard work. The board reacts to this change by increasing the role of stock returns in executive compensation contracts. This is consistent with the view that the principal dynamically adjusts executive compensation contracts to make them incentive compatible (Tirole and Laffont, 1988; Hall and Knox, 2004; He, 2011). Our study provides critical implications for the importance of institutional environments to impact governance reforms in emerging markets and beyond.

Suggested Citation

  • Wenjun Liu & Qian He & June Cao, 2025. "The Accountability System for Material Misstatements and Executive Pay Performance Sensitivity: A Quasi‐natural Experiment," Abacus, Accounting Foundation, University of Sydney, vol. 61(2), pages 498-553, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:abacus:v:61:y:2025:i:2:p:498-553
    DOI: 10.1111/abac.12335
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/abac.12335
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/abac.12335?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Holmstrom, Bengt, 1989. "Agency costs and innovation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 305-327, December.
    2. Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, 2003. "Enjoying the Quiet Life? Corporate Governance and Managerial Preferences," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 111(5), pages 1043-1075, October.
    3. Jongjaroenkamol, Prasart & Laux, Volker, 2017. "Insider versus outsider CEOs, executive compensation, and accounting manipulation," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 253-261.
    4. Fram, Eugene H., 2004. "Governance reform - it's only just begun," Business Horizons, Elsevier, vol. 47(6), pages 10-14.
    5. Bin Li & Gianfranco Siciliano & Mohan Venkatachalam & Patricia Naranjo & Rodrigo S. Verdi, 2021. "Economic Consequences of IFRS Adoption: The Role of Changes in Disclosure Quality," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 38(1), pages 129-179, March.
    6. Brian J. Hall & Thomas A. Knox, 2004. "Underwater Options and the Dynamics of Executive Pay‐to‐Performance Sensitivities," Journal of Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 42(2), pages 365-412, May.
    7. Fan, Rui & Pan, Jianping & Yu, Minggui & Gao, Hao, 2022. "Corporate governance of controlling shareholders and labor employment decisions: Evidence from a parent board reform in China," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 108(C).
    8. Rhodes, Adrienne, 2016. "The relation between earnings-based measures in firm debt contracts and CEO pay sensitivity to earnings," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 1-22.
    9. Rajiv D. Banker & Rong Huang & Ramachandran Natarajan, 2009. "Incentive Contracting and Value Relevance of Earnings and Cash Flows," Journal of Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 47(3), pages 647-678, June.
    10. Martin Nienhaus, 2022. "Executive equity incentives and opportunistic manager behavior: new evidence from a quasi-natural experiment," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 27(4), pages 1276-1318, December.
    11. Emily Oster, 2019. "Unobservable Selection and Coefficient Stability: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 37(2), pages 187-204, April.
    12. Zhang, Xiaoqian & Yu, Mingqiang & Chen, Gaoquan, 2020. "Does mixed-ownership reform improve SOEs' innovation? Evidence from state ownership," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 61(C).
    13. Lang, Mark & Smith Raedy, Jana & Wilson, Wendy, 2006. "Earnings management and cross listing: Are reconciled earnings comparable to US earnings?," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(1-2), pages 255-283, October.
    14. Dordzhieva, Aysa & Laux, Volker & Zheng, Ronghuo, 2022. "Signaling private information via accounting system design," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(1).
    15. Erkens, Michael H.R. & Gan, Ying & Yurtoglu, B. Burcin, 2018. "Not all clawbacks are the same: Consequences of strong versus weak clawback provisions," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 291-317.
    16. Yanfeng Xue, 2007. "Make or buy new technology: The role of CEO compensation contract in a firm’s route to innovation," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 12(4), pages 659-690, December.
    17. Xia Chen & Qiang Cheng & Ying Hao & Qiang Liu, 2020. "GDP growth incentives and earnings management: evidence from China," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 25(3), pages 1002-1039, September.
    18. Xuan Tian & Tracy Yue Wang, 2014. "Tolerance for Failure and Corporate Innovation," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 27(1), pages 211-255, January.
    19. Vasia Panousi & Dimitris Papanikolaou, 2012. "Investment, Idiosyncratic Risk, and Ownership," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 67(3), pages 1113-1148, June.
    20. Patricia M. Dechow & Richard G. Sloan & Amy P. Sweeney, 1996. "Causes and Consequences of Earnings Manipulation: An Analysis of Firms Subject to Enforcement Actions by the SEC," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 13(1), pages 1-36, March.
    21. Marinovic, Iván & Povel, Paul, 2017. "Competition for talent under performance manipulation," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 1-14.
    22. Ke, Bin & Petroni, Kathy & Safieddine, Assem, 1999. "Ownership concentration and sensitivity of executive pay to accounting performance measures: Evidence from publicly and privately-held insurance companies," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 185-209, December.
    23. Hsihui Chang & Guy D. Fernando & Woody Liao, 2009. "Sarbanes‐Oxley Act, perceived earnings quality and cost of capital," Review of Accounting and Finance, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 8(3), pages 216-231, August.
    24. Dichu Bao & Simon Yu Kit Fung & Lixin (Nancy) Su, 2018. "Can Shareholders Be at Rest after Adopting Clawback Provisions? Evidence from Stock Price Crash Risk," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 35(3), pages 1578-1615, September.
    25. Jensen, Michael C & Murphy, Kevin J, 1990. "Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(2), pages 225-264, April.
    26. Kim, Jeong-Bon & Li, Yinghua & Zhang, Liandong, 2011. "Corporate tax avoidance and stock price crash risk: Firm-level analysis," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 100(3), pages 639-662, June.
    27. Cohen, Daniel A. & Zarowin, Paul, 2010. "Accrual-based and real earnings management activities around seasoned equity offerings," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 2-19, May.
    28. Carter, Mary Ellen & Choi, Jen & Sedatole, Karen L., 2021. "The effect of supplier industry competition on pay-for-performance incentive intensity," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(2).
    29. Kenneth M. Lehn & Mengxin Zhao, 2006. "CEO Turnover after Acquisitions: Are Bad Bidders Fired?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 61(4), pages 1759-1811, August.
    30. Vaughan S. Radcliffe & Crawford Spence & Mitchell Stein, 2017. "The Impotence of Accountability: The Relationship Between Greater Transparency and Corporate Reform," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 34(1), pages 622-657, March.
    31. Biddle, Gary C. & Bowen, Robert M. & Wallace, James S., 1997. "Does EVA(R) beat earnings? Evidence on associations with stock returns and firm values," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 301-336, December.
    32. Sloan, Richard G., 1993. "Accounting earnings and top executive compensation," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(1-3), pages 55-100, April.
    33. Dahya, Jay & McConnell, John J., 2007. "Board Composition, Corporate Performance, and the Cadbury Committee Recommendation," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 42(3), pages 535-564, September.
    34. Roychowdhury, Sugata, 2006. "Earnings management through real activities manipulation," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(3), pages 335-370, December.
    35. Ole‐Kristian Hope & Wayne B. Thomas, 2008. "Managerial Empire Building and Firm Disclosure," Journal of Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 46(3), pages 591-626, June.
    36. Xu, Wenming & Xu, Guangdong, 2020. "Understanding public enforcement of securities law in China: An empirical analysis of the enforcement actions of the CSRC and its regional offices against informational misconduct," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(C).
    37. Guidry, Flora & J. Leone, Andrew & Rock, Steve, 1999. "Earnings-based bonus plans and earnings management by business-unit managers1," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(1-3), pages 113-142, January.
    38. Ron Shalev & Ivy Xiying Zhang & Yong Zhang, 2013. "CEO Compensation and Fair Value Accounting: Evidence from Purchase Price Allocation," Journal of Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 51(4), pages 819-854, September.
    39. Daniel A. Cohen & Aiyesha Dey & Thomas z. Lys, 2013. "Corporate Governance Reform and Executive Incentives: Implications for Investments and Risk Taking," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 30(4), pages 1296-1332, December.
    40. Naaraayanan, S. Lakshmi & Nielsen, Kasper Meisner, 2021. "Does personal liability deter individuals from serving as independent directors?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 140(2), pages 621-643.
    41. Praveen Kumar, 2008. "Who Monitors the Monitor? The Effect of Board Independence on Executive Compensation and Firm Value," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 21(3), pages 1371-1401, May.
    42. Goldman, Eitan & Slezak, Steve L., 2006. "An equilibrium model of incentive contracts in the presence of information manipulation," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 80(3), pages 603-626, June.
    43. Nagar, Venky & Schoenfeld, Jordan, 2021. "Shareholder monitoring and discretionary disclosure," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(1).
    44. Hsihui Chang & Guy D. Fernando & Woody Liao, 2009. "Sarbanes‐Oxley Act, perceived earnings quality and cost of capital," Review of Accounting and Finance, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 8(3), pages 216-231, August.
    45. He, Zhiguo, 2011. "A model of dynamic compensation and capital structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 100(2), pages 351-366, May.
    46. Francis, Jere R., 1984. "The effect of audit firm size on audit prices : A study of the Australian Market," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 6(2), pages 133-151, August.
    47. Dey, Aiyesha, 2010. "The chilling effect of Sarbanes-Oxley: A discussion of Sarbanes-Oxley and corporate risk-taking," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(1-2), pages 53-57, February.
    48. John Asker & Joan Farre-Mensa & Alexander Ljungqvist, 2015. "Corporate Investment and Stock Market Listing: A Puzzle?," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 28(2), pages 342-390.
    49. Yu, Fang (Frank), 2008. "Analyst coverage and earnings management," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(2), pages 245-271, May.
    50. Antonio Davila & Fernando Penalva, 2006. "Governance structure and the weighting of performance measures in CEO compensation," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 11(4), pages 463-493, December.
    51. Hsihui Chang & Guy D. Fernando & Woody Liao, 2009. "Sarbanes‐Oxley Act, perceived earnings quality and cost of capital," Review of Accounting and Finance, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 8(3), pages 216-231, August.
    52. Engel, Ellen & Hayes, Rachel M. & Wang, Xue, 2003. "CEO turnover and properties of accounting information," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(1-3), pages 197-226, December.
    53. Dechow, Patricia M. & Myers, Linda A. & Shakespeare, Catherine, 2010. "Fair value accounting and gains from asset securitizations: A convenient earnings management tool with compensation side-benefits," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(1-2), pages 2-25, February.
    54. Healy, Paul M., 1985. "The effect of bonus schemes on accounting decisions," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(1-3), pages 85-107, April.
    55. Cheng, Mei & Dhaliwal, Dan & Zhang, Yuan, 2013. "Does investment efficiency improve after the disclosure of material weaknesses in internal control over financial reporting?," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 1-18.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Liu, Wenjun & Lin, Guoyu & He, Qian, 2024. "Enhanced management information disclosure responsibilities and corporate risk-taking: Evidence from the accountability system for errors in China," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 89(PB), pages 511-531.
    2. Dechow, Patricia & Ge, Weili & Schrand, Catherine, 2010. "Understanding earnings quality: A review of the proxies, their determinants and their consequences," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(2-3), pages 344-401, December.
    3. Richard Frankel & Hagit Levy & Ron Shalev, 2017. "Factors Associated with the Year-End Decline in Working Capital," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 63(2), pages 438-458, February.
    4. Wenxia Ge & Jeong-Bon Kim, 2014. "Boards, takeover protection, and real earnings management," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 43(4), pages 651-682, November.
    5. Sun, Sophia Li & Habib, Ahsan & Huang, Hedy Jiaying, 2019. "Tournament incentives and stock price crash risk: Evidence from China," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 93-117.
    6. Armstrong, Christopher S. & Guay, Wayne R. & Weber, Joseph P., 2010. "The role of information and financial reporting in corporate governance and debt contracting," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(2-3), pages 179-234, December.
    7. Ruichang Lu & Weijia He & Xiaojun Zhang, 2023. "Using Available‐for‐sale Securities to Smooth Earnings: Evidence from China," Abacus, Accounting Foundation, University of Sydney, vol. 59(1), pages 163-196, March.
    8. Biddle, Gary C. & Chan, Lilian H. & Joo, Jeong Hwan, 2024. "Clawback adoptions, managerial compensation incentives, capital investment mix and efficiency," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 84(C).
    9. David S. Koo & Santhosh Ramalingegowda & Yong Yu, 2017. "The effect of financial reporting quality on corporate dividend policy," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 22(2), pages 753-790, June.
    10. Xiaoqi Chen & Maoliang Li & Dorcas Nduakoh & Ling Na Belinda Yau, 2025. "Mandatory disclosure of key audit matters and the choice of earnings management," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 65(1), pages 251-288, March.
    11. Liu, Wenjun & He, Qian & Cao, June & Kamar, Amina, 2024. "Exploring the catalysts of eco-innovation: Employee ownership and sustainable practices," Technological Forecasting and Social Change, Elsevier, vol. 207(C).
    12. Roychowdhury, Sugata & Shroff, Nemit & Verdi, Rodrigo S., 2019. "The effects of financial reporting and disclosure on corporate investment: A review," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(2).
    13. Zhang, Xuehui & Tan, Jianhua & Chen, Yining & Chan, Kam C., 2021. "Does environmental law enforcement matter for financial reporting quality?," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 57(C).
    14. Chun-An Li & Tse-Mao Lin & Yu-Wen Huang, 2018. "Managerial Overconfidence, Compensation Induced Risk Taking, And Earnings Management," The International Journal of Business and Finance Research, The Institute for Business and Finance Research, vol. 12(2), pages 1-26.
    15. Inho Suk & Seungwon Lee & William Kross, 2021. "CEO Turnover and Accounting Earnings: The Role of Earnings Persistence," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(5), pages 3195-3218, May.
    16. Loureiro, Gilberto & Silva, Sónia, 2022. "Earnings management and stock price crashes post U.S. cross-delistings," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 82(C).
    17. repec:spt:apfiba:v::y:2018:i::f:8_2_2 is not listed on IDEAS
    18. Pan Xu & Jun He & Daojuan Wang & Sofia A. Johan & Siwei Lin, 2024. "Could the simultaneous persistence of greater cash holdings and interest‐bearing debts affect stock price crash risk?," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 29(3), pages 3226-3262, July.
    19. Nagar, Neerav & Sen, Kaustav, 2016. "Earnings Management Strategies during Financial Distress," IIMA Working Papers WP2016-02-03, Indian Institute of Management Ahmedabad, Research and Publication Department.
    20. Oh, Seungbin & Choi, Ahrum, 2025. "How does divergence of control and cash-flow rights influence cost stickiness?," The British Accounting Review, Elsevier, vol. 57(3).
    21. Josef Schroth, 2018. "Managerial Compensation and Stock Price Manipulation," Journal of Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 56(5), pages 1335-1381, December.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:abacus:v:61:y:2025:i:2:p:498-553. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0001-3072 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.