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This article discusses the effective role of Britten Woods institutions, specifically the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB), in supporting wage and/or remuneration policies in developing countries, with a focus on Mozambique. The research used bibliographical references on the subject, statistical data from international organizations, official websites of the Government of Mozambique, analysis of reports from IMF and WB, and documents available in important online repositories. This allowed, on the one hand, to understand the genesis of Bretton Woods, whose objectives are to define common rules of behavior for countries to achieve macroeconomic stability. It also allowed the formulation of theories on the dominant role of these institutions, associated with the understanding of the role of the political environment for the implementation of a feasible wage policy. On the other hand, it allowed the understanding of the variables, essential steps for the implementation of a sustainable wage policy in Mozambique, and the fiscal nature as a tool for self-financing wage policy, as an alternative to the institutions to the IMF and WB, which, with the change of the political system in Mozambique, from socialist to capitalist, they supported economic reforms, specifically wage policy, with an emphasis on monetary policy, having in the last 3 years supported the introduction of the Single Wage Table (TSU), whose introduction precedes the Old Wage Table (TSA) and aims to correct the imbalances that characterized the remuneration system of the direct and indirect administration of the State, as well as avoiding the instability of the payroll resulting from the indexation of wage subsidies/supplements to the base salary. Finally, the article found that the IMF and WB have always had enormous power to reshape market rules in their own favor and that for Mozambique to balance its (in)dependence on financing wage policy, it must deepen other sources of financing with comparative advantages aimed at profit, which implies strengthening the capacity to negotiate with other international financing institutions, and also improving the mobilization, through diversification, of internal revenues.
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