Critical Rationalism and Bayesianism

Most accounts of the scientific method, e.g.s the Deductive-Nomological (D-N), Inductive Statistical (I-S), and so on, attempt to avoid Hume’s problem. Popper’s philosophy of critical rationalism and subjectivist Bayesianism come into conflict here on a number of points. The most noteworthy is on the problem of induction. That is, if science rests on induction (as Sir Francis Bacon would have it), and induction cannot be justified according to the strict demands of classical deductive validity without invoking a circularity, how can we say that science is rational? And how should scientists proceed? Bayesians utilizes a consistent multivalued logic that adheres to the Kolmogorov axioms. And on the other side, Sir Karl Popper maintains that the real logic of science is deductive. It is a myth that induction is even used. I will evaluate both claims through a third-party lens. That is, Micheal Ruse’ s epigenetic account of inferential reasoning. This is a modified version of Hume’s propensity theory. Ultimately, deductivism cannot explain how proto-humans behaved in the wild. How they grew smarter, became tool-using beings, and became the dominant species on the planet.