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Feedback Rules for Inflation Control: An Overview of Recent Literature

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Feedback rules are rules aimed at guiding policy-makers as they face the problem of keeping inflation close to a desired path without causing variability elsewhere in the economy. These rules link short-term interest rates, controlled by the central bank, to the rate of inflation and/or its deviation from a target rate. The authors describe the most popular types of feedback rules and review some simulation results.

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  • Jamie Armour & Agathe Côté, 2000. "Feedback Rules for Inflation Control: An Overview of Recent Literature," Bank of Canada Review, Bank of Canada, vol. 1999(Winter), pages 43-54.
  • Handle: RePEc:bca:bcarev:v:2000:y:2000:i:winter99-00:p:43-54
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    1. Cohen, Daniel, 2001. "The HIPC Initiative: True and False Promises," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 4(3), pages 363-380, Winter.
    2. George J. Benston & George G. Kaufman, 1998. "Deposit insurance reform in the FDIC Improvement Act: the experience to date," Economic Perspectives, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, issue Q II, pages 2-20.
    3. Kenneth Rogoff, 1999. "International Institutions for Reducing Global Financial Instability," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 13(4), pages 21-42, Fall.
    4. Miller, Marcus & Zhang, Lei, 2000. "Sovereign Liquidity Crises: The Strategic Case for a Payments Standstill," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 110(460), pages 335-362, January.
    5. Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, 2000. "Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, pages 14-23.
    6. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-491, June.
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