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Public-Private Partnerships: Goods and the Structure of Contracts


  • Gordon Rausser
  • Reid Stevens

    () (Robert Gordon Sproul Distinguished Professor, University of California, Berkeley, California 94720
    Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, University of California, Berkeley, California 94720)


This paper presents a framework for analyzing the structure of contracts for public-private partnerships (PPP) that produce products and services that generally include mixtures of both public and private goods. A three-stage framework, sourced with the incomplete contracting and control rights literature, is advanced to evaluate the successes and failures of a variety of PPP in the natural resources. These case studies provide unique insights into the contract structures that are typically designed for the management and provision of impure public goods. We demonstrate the desired contract structure of a PPP depends on the type of good or service produced, and it is this pivotal point that generally results in shared authority in the extraction or production and consumptive distribution of natural resources.

Suggested Citation

  • Gordon Rausser & Reid Stevens, 2009. "Public-Private Partnerships: Goods and the Structure of Contracts," Annual Review of Resource Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 1(1), pages 75-98, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:anr:reseco:v:1:y:2009:p:75-98

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    Cited by:

    1. Karel Janda & Gordon Rausser, 2011. "Comparing American and European Regulation of Over-the- Counter Derivative Securities," European Financial and Accounting Journal, University of Economics, Prague, vol. 2011(4), pages 7-19.

    More about this item


    incomplete contracting; control rights; impure goods; environmental remediation; infrastructure development; water sanitation; public goods research;

    JEL classification:

    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • H44 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Publicly Provided Goods: Mixed Markets
    • H54 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Infrastructures
    • Q53 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Air Pollution; Water Pollution; Noise; Hazardous Waste; Solid Waste; Recycling
    • Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy


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