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Co-ordination and public administration in a global economy — A Hungarian point of view


  • Attila Chikán

    () (Corvinus University of Budapest, Institute of Business Economics, Fővám tér 8, H-1092 Budapest, Hungary)


The purpose of social co-ordination mechanisms is to co-ordinate the activities of individuals and organisations specialised in the distribution of work. The paper reviews five basic types of mechanisms: market, bureaucratic, ethical, aggressive and co-operative co-ordination. Today’s world operates on the basis of a duality: international cooperation is based on nation states, in which the public administrations work according to bureaucratic coordination. However, the increasingly globalised market responds to the logic of market coordination. The article argues that in terms of understanding the working of public administration, the various coordination mechanisms are of crucial importance, especially where various mechanisms meet, such as the relationship between nation states and multinational corporations.

Suggested Citation

  • Attila Chikán, 2009. "Co-ordination and public administration in a global economy — A Hungarian point of view," Society and Economy, Akadémiai Kiadó, Hungary, vol. 31(1), pages 71-92, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:aka:soceco:v:31:y:2009:i:1:p:71-92
    Note: This study is a revised version of a chapter of my article “Social Co-ordination Mechanisms and the Public Sector” published in the issue of Pénzügyi Szemle (Financial Review) 2007/3–4, which is published here with the permission of Pénzügyi Szemle.

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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item


    co-ordination mechanisms; public administration; Hungary;

    JEL classification:

    • F23 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - Multinational Firms; International Business
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government


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