Wynagrodzenia menedżerów a cele ekonomiczne spółek notowanych na Giełdzie Papierów Wartościowych w Warszawie

The aim of the paper is to empirically verify the relationships between the salaries of board members and the economic objectives of listed companies, especially their strategic goals. The sample comprised companies with at least a seven-year history of being listed on the WSE where at least one board member was holding his or her position for the entire period of analysis. In the literature on the subject no results meeting such criteria have been found. To verify these relationships, the Pearson correlation coefficient was used, and the study covered the 2005–2011 period, which allowed for a strategic perspective of management, i.e. made it possible to identify the actual contribution of a given manager to the company’s economic performance. The year 2005 was selected as the beginning of the study period since it was the first year when companies were required by law to present information on the salaries of individual board members in their annual financial reports. The selection of 2011 as the final year of the study period was determined by intense rotation among board members in the following years, which significantly reduced the size of the sample. Among the companies listed on the WSE, approximately 14 percent of the businesses and 6 percent of the managers met the criteria of the study as of Dec. 31, 2011. The results reveal that in roughly 88 percent of the analyzed companies and 90 percent of the managers no positive statistically significant correlation was found between the salaries of individual managers and companies’ strategic objectives. Similar results were obtained for the relationship between salaries and other economic objectives of companies; this lack of a positive and statistically significant correlation between those variables was found in about 93 percent of the companies and 90 percent of the managers.