Optimal Labor Contracts with Asymmetric Information and More than Two Types of Agent
In the paper we discuss the optimal labor agreements between workers and firms in the situation of asymmetric information. Using a standard adverse selection model, we analyze the optimality of the labor contracts when it is the firm which has private information affecting the results of the contractual relationship. We propose an alternative procedure to solve the optimization problem, using the informational rents as variables. In the last part of the paper we derive and comment the features of the optimal labor contracts in asymmetric information.
Volume (Year): XVIII(2012) (2012)
Issue (Month): 5(570) (May)
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Bucharest, Calea Griviţei nr. 21, sector 1, 010702|
Phone: +40 21 3 12 22 48
Fax: +40 21 3 12 97 17
Web page: http://www.asociatiaeconomistilor.ro/
More information through EDIRC
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:agr:journl:v:5(570):y:2012:i:5(570):p:5-18. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Marin Dinu)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.