Optimal Labor Contracts with Asymmetric Information and More than Two Types of Agent
In the paper we discuss the optimal labor agreements between workers and firms in the situation of asymmetric information. Using a standard adverse selection model, we analyze the optimality of the labor contracts when it is the firm which has private information affecting the results of the contractual relationship. We propose an alternative procedure to solve the optimization problem, using the informational rents as variables. In the last part of the paper we derive and comment the features of the optimal labor contracts in asymmetric information.
Volume (Year): XVIII(2012) (2012)
Issue (Month): 5(570) (May)
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: +40 21 3 12 22 48
Fax: +40 21 3 12 97 17
Web page: http://www.asociatiaeconomistilor.ro/Email:
More information through EDIRC
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:agr:journl:v:5(570):y:2012:i:5(570):p:5-18. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Marin Dinu)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.