IDEAS home Printed from
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this article

Democracy and Corruption: On the Limited Role of Political Accountability in Deterring Asset Stripping

Listed author(s):
  • Melvin D. Ayogu


    (Fellow, Africa Growth Initiative, Brookings Institution)

  • Tendai Gwatidzo


    (School of Economics and Business Sciences, University of Witwatersrand)

Focusing on capital flight of the worst kind for developing countries-stolen public assets-we develop a model which shows that both the threat of losing elective office and its complement, the threat of delayed detection, do not affect the choice of whether to plunder or not. Rather they mitigate the level of plundering. The role of instantaneous detection in the model drives the implication that separating a miscreant from the benefits of his crime can be an effective deterrent. However, such weaponry requires investment in the capabilities for "integrated financial investigation" and international cooperation. The ideas espoused in this paper corroborate the logic of the StAR initiative of the UNODC and the World Bank. We suggest the development of a research agenda on how to (i) grow adequate capabilities for detection, and (ii) create the political demand for the required international cooperation.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL:
Download Restriction: no

Article provided by African Finance and Economic Association in its journal Journal of African Development.

Volume (Year): 13 (2011)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Pages: 223-236

in new window

Handle: RePEc:afe:journl:v:13:y:2011:i:2:p:223-236
Contact details of provider: Web page:

More information through EDIRC

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:afe:journl:v:13:y:2011:i:2:p:223-236. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Mwangi wa Githinji)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.