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Anreize der Gesetzgebung zu Arzneimitteln für seltene Leiden – Überlegungen zu Versorgung, Qualität und Effizienz


  • Nguyen, Von Tristan
  • Rohlf, Karsten


Patients suffering orphan diseases are less likely to receive a treatment than patients suffering diseases of high prevalence. Legislators in Europe and the USA aim to provide incentives for research, development and placing on the market of designated orphan medicinal products. In the paper, we use a modified model about monopoly quality to analyze the legal incentives. We show that neither an approval costs refund nor a subsidy for drug purchase will lead to a quality improvement of drugs. On the other hand, market exclusivity, reimbursement of research and development costs as well as fostering cooperation between universities and pharmaceutical industry can lead to higher drug quality.

Suggested Citation

  • Nguyen, Von Tristan & Rohlf, Karsten, 2013. "Anreize der Gesetzgebung zu Arzneimitteln für seltene Leiden – Überlegungen zu Versorgung, Qualität und Effizienz," Schmollers Jahrbuch : Journal of Applied Social Science Studies / Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, vol. 133(1), pages 43-65.
  • Handle: RePEc:aeq:aeqsjb:v133_y2013_i1_q1_p43-65

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    JEL classification:

    • I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
    • I12 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Health Behavior
    • K20 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - General


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