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M2M Call Termination – regulation or competition?

Author

Listed:
  • Tommy Staahl Gabrielsen
  • Steinar Vagstad

Abstract

We review the recent literature on mobile termination rates (MTR) in mobile communication networks (M2M). This literature shows that mobile networks may have incentives to charge ineficient high termination charges leading to reduced surplus for consumers and society, and therefore should be regulated. We discuss optimal regulation of MTRs and the two main objectives behind current regulation: excessive pricing and entry assistance. We also present a sketch of a new regulatory regime for the mobile industry.

Suggested Citation

  • Tommy Staahl Gabrielsen & Steinar Vagstad, 2008. "M2M Call Termination – regulation or competition?," Applied Economics Quarterly (formerly: Konjunkturpolitik), Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, vol. 54(3), pages 203-215.
  • Handle: RePEc:aeq:aeqaeq:v54_y2008_i3_q3_p203-21
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    Cited by:

    1. Dewenter, Ralf & Kruse, Jörn, 2011. "Calling party pays or receiving party pays? The diffusion of mobile telephony with endogenous regulation," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 107-117, March.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Regulation; competition; termination charges;

    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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