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Polarization, Valence, and Policy Competition

Author

Listed:
  • Peter Buisseret
  • Richard Van Weelden

Abstract

We study an election between two office-seeking candidates who are polarized along a partisan issue dimension when one candidate has a valence advantage. The candidates compete by choosing policy on a second issue dimension about which voters' preferences are uncertain. Existing work predicts that the low-valence candidate "gambles for resurrection" by adopting non-centrist policies in order to differentiate from a stronger opponent. We show that this prediction is reversed in a highly polarized environment: the strong candidate chooses policies less aligned with the electorate but nonetheless wins the election with higher probability.

Suggested Citation

  • Peter Buisseret & Richard Van Weelden, 2022. "Polarization, Valence, and Policy Competition," American Economic Review: Insights, American Economic Association, vol. 4(3), pages 341-352, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aerins:v:4:y:2022:i:3:p:341-52
    DOI: 10.1257/aeri.20210169
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D11 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Theory
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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