Corruption in Procurement and the Political Cycle in Tunneling: Evidence from Financial Transactions Data
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- Maxim Mironov & Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, 2016. "Corruption in Procurement and the Political Cycle in Tunneling: Evidence from Financial Transactions Data," Post-Print halshs-01513327, HAL.
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- Günther G. Schulze & Nikita Zakharov, 2018. "Corruption in Russia - Historic Legacy and Systemic Nature," CESifo Working Paper Series 6864, CESifo Group Munich.
- repec:eee:poleco:v:52:y:2018:i:c:p:55-74 is not listed on IDEAS
- Jonathan Lehne & Jacob N. Shapiro & Oliver Vanden Eynde, 2016. "Building connections: Political corruption and road construction in India," Working Papers halshs-01349350, HAL.
- Audinga Baltrunaite & Cristina Giorgiantonio & Sauro Mocetti & Tommaso Orlando, 2018. "Discretion and supplier selection in public procurement," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 1178, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
- Ozlem Akin & Nicholas S. Coleman & Christian Fons-Rosen & José-Luis Peydró, 2016.
"Political Connections: Evidence From Insider Trading Around TARP,"
935, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
- Ozlem Akin & Nicholas S. Coleman & Christian Fons-Rosen & José-Luis Peydró, 2016. "Political connections: Evidence from insider trading around TARP," Economics Working Papers 1542, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Apr 2018.
- Mass, Helene & Fugger, Nicolas & Gretschko, Vitali & Wambach, Achim, 2017.
"Imitation perfection - a simple rule to prevent discrimination in procurement,"
Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking
168217, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Mass, Helene & Fugger, Nicolas & Gretschko, Vitali & Wambach, Achim, 2017. "Imitation perfection: A simple rule to prevent discrimination in procurement," ZEW Discussion Papers 17-058, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
- repec:eee:deveco:v:131:y:2018:i:c:p:62-78 is not listed on IDEAS
- Muraközy, Balázs & Telegdy, Álmos, 2016.
"Political incentives and state subsidy allocation: Evidence from Hungarian municipalities,"
European Economic Review,
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- Balázs Murakozy & Almos Telegdy, 2015. "Political Incentives and State Subsidy Allocation: Evidence from Hungarian Municipalities," IEHAS Discussion Papers 1531, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences.
- repec:eee:ecosys:v:41:y:2017:i:1:p:52-67 is not listed on IDEAS
- Lehne, Jonathan & Shapiro, Jacob N. & Vanden Eynde, Oliver, 2018.
"Building connections: Political corruption and road construction in India,"
Journal of Development Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 131(C), pages 62-78.
- Jonathan Lehne & Jacob Shapiro & Oliver Vanden Eynde, 2018. "Building connections: Political corruption and road construction in India," Post-Print halshs-01802896, HAL.
More about this item
- D22 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- H57 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Procurement
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
- P26 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Systems and Transition Economies - - - Political Economy
- P31 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - Socialist Enterprises and Their Transitions
- P37 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - Legal
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