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Hurricanes, Climate Change Policies, and Electoral Accountability

Author

Listed:
  • Stefano Gagliarducci
  • M. Daniele Paserman
  • Eleonora Patacchini

Abstract

This paper studies the conditions under which legislators promote policies that may be unpopular in the short term but yield long-term benefits. Using data on the universe of federal disaster declarations from 1989 to 2020, we document that representatives from congressional districts impacted by hurricanes are more inclined to support environmental legislation addressing climate change. However, this response depends on political circumstances: Only those in safe seats can change their political agenda toward policies that involve short-term costs for long-term gains. These results highlight the role of electoral incentives in shaping politicians' attitudes toward farsighted policymaking.

Suggested Citation

  • Stefano Gagliarducci & M. Daniele Paserman & Eleonora Patacchini, 2026. "Hurricanes, Climate Change Policies, and Electoral Accountability," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 18(3), pages 135-162, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejpol:v:18:y:2026:i:3:p:135-62
    DOI: 10.1257/pol.20230070
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters and their Management; Global Warming
    • Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy

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