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Pandering in the Shadows: How Natural Disasters Affect Special Interest Politics

Author

Listed:
  • Ethan Kaplan
  • Jörg L. Spenkuch
  • Haishan Yuan

Abstract

We exploit the quasi-random timing of natural disasters to study the connection between public attention to politics and legislators' support for special interests. We show that when a disaster strikes, the news media reduce coverage of politics in general and of individual legislators in particular, and members of the House of Representatives become significantly more likely to adopt special interest donors' positions. The evidence implies that politicians are more inclined to take actions benefiting special interests when the public is distracted. More broadly, our findings suggest that attention to politics improves electoral accountability even in an environment with stringent transparency requirements.

Suggested Citation

  • Ethan Kaplan & Jörg L. Spenkuch & Haishan Yuan, 2025. "Pandering in the Shadows: How Natural Disasters Affect Special Interest Politics," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 17(3), pages 441-470, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejpol:v:17:y:2025:i:3:p:441-70
    DOI: 10.1257/pol.20230783
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Spenkuch, Jörg L., 2012. "Moral hazard and selection among the poor: Evidence from a randomized experiment," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 72-85.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • L82 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Entertainment; Media
    • Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters and their Management; Global Warming

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