Optimal Project Selection Mechanisms
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Other versions of this item:
- Talia Bar & Sidartha Gordon, 2013. "Optimal Project Selection Mechanisms," Sciences Po Economics Discussion Papers 2013-08, Sciences Po Departement of Economics.
- Talia Bar & Sidartha Gordon, 2013. "Optimal Project Selection Mechanisms," Sciences Po publications 2013-08, Sciences Po.
- Talia Bar & Sidartha Gordon, 2013. "Optimal Project Selection Mechanisms," Working Papers hal-00972867, HAL.
References listed on IDEAS
- Manelli, Alejandro M & Vincent, Daniel R, 1995. "Optimal Procurement Mechanisms," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(3), pages 591-620, May.
- John Moore, 1985. "Optimal Labour Contracts when Workers have a Variety of Privately Observed Reservation Wages," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 52(1), pages 37-67.
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- Alejandro M. Manelli & Daniel R. Vincent, 2010. "Bayesian and Dominant‐Strategy Implementation in the Independent Private‐Values Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 78(6), pages 1905-1938, November.
- Shin, Dongsoo, 2008. "Information acquisition and optimal project management," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(4), pages 1032-1043, July.
- Roger B. Myerson, 1981. "Optimal Auction Design," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 6(1), pages 58-73, February.
- Mookherjee, Dilip & Reichelstein, Stefan, 1992. "Dominant strategy implementation of Bayesian incentive compatible allocation rules," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 378-399, April.
- Krishna, Vijay, 2009. "Auction Theory," Elsevier Monographs, Elsevier, edition 2, number 9780123745071.
- Richard A. Lambert, 1986. "Executive Effort and Selection of Risky Projects," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(1), pages 77-88, Spring.
- Scott Stern, 2004. "Do Scientists Pay to Be Scientists?," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 50(6), pages 835-853, June.
- Che, Yeon-Koo & Gale, Ian, 2000. "The Optimal Mechanism for Selling to a Budget-Constrained Buyer," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 92(2), pages 198-233, June.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Raphael Boleslavsky & Christopher Cotton, 2015. "Limited Capacity in Project Selection: Competition Through Evidence Production," Working Papers 1343, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
- Blumrosen, Liad & Feldman, Michal, 2013. "Mechanism design with a restricted action space," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 424-443.
More about this item
- D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- O32 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Management of Technological Innovation and R&D
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