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Opportunity Hunters: A Model of Competitive Sequential Inspections

Author

Listed:
  • Ran Eilat
  • Zvika Neeman
  • Eilon Solan

Abstract

We introduce a new type of games, called "opportunity-hunting games," in which two players compete to discover an uncertain event ("opportunity") that occurs at an unobserved and random point in time. Players can inspect whether the event has already occurred again and again, but each inspection is costly. Varying the parameters of the model spans the range from games where competition between the players to be the first to identify the opportunity is the dominant force, to games in which free riding on the other player's effort is the dominant force. We characterize the game's unique symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium.

Suggested Citation

  • Ran Eilat & Zvika Neeman & Eilon Solan, 2026. "Opportunity Hunters: A Model of Competitive Sequential Inspections," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 18(2), pages 228-267, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:18:y:2026:i:2:p:228-67
    DOI: 10.1257/mic.20240245
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

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