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Information Acquisition and Product Differentiation Perception

Author

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  • Gary Biglaiser
  • Jiadong Gu
  • Fei Li

Abstract

We consider the equilibrium interplay between sellers' price competition and consumers' perception of product differentiation. We analyze a situation where, before trading, consumers acquire information at a cost about their preferences between sellers' differentiated products. The incentive for information acquisition depends on the average value of products, the objective product differentiation, and their beliefs about sellers' prices. The acquired information shapes consumers' perceived product differentiation and sellers' equilibrium prices. We characterize the unique symmetric equilibrium and study comparative statics with respect to consumer information acquisition cost and sensitivity to product differentiation.

Suggested Citation

  • Gary Biglaiser & Jiadong Gu & Fei Li, 2025. "Information Acquisition and Product Differentiation Perception," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 17(3), pages 1-34, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:17:y:2025:i:3:p:1-34
    DOI: 10.1257/mic.20230104
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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