IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/aejmic/v16y2024i2p236-66.html

Contingent Reasoning and Dynamic Public Goods Provision

Author

Listed:
  • Evan M. Calford
  • Timothy N. Cason

Abstract

Contributions toward public goods often reveal information that is useful to others considering their own contributions. This experiment compares static and dynamic contribution decisions to determine how contingent reasoning differs in dynamic decisions where equilibrium requires understanding how future information can inform about prior events. This identifies partially cursed individuals who can only extract partial information from contingent events, others who are better at extracting information from past rather than future or concurrent events, and Nash players who effectively perform contingent thinking. Contrary to equilibrium, the dynamic provision mechanism does not lead to lower contributions than the static mechanism.

Suggested Citation

  • Evan M. Calford & Timothy N. Cason, 2024. "Contingent Reasoning and Dynamic Public Goods Provision," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 16(2), pages 236-266, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:16:y:2024:i:2:p:236-66
    DOI: 10.1257/mic.20220111
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.aeaweb.org/doi/10.1257/mic.20220111
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://doi.org/10.3886/E192103V1
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://www.aeaweb.org/doi/10.1257/mic.20220111.appx
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://www.aeaweb.org/doi/10.1257/mic.20220111.ds
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to AEA members and institutional subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1257/mic.20220111?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Ignacio Esponda & Emanuel Vespa, 2024. "Contingent Thinking and the Sure-Thing Principle: Revisiting Classic Anomalies in the Laboratory," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 91(5), pages 2806-2831.
    3. Niederle, Muriel & Vespa, Emanuel, 2023. "Cognitive Limitations: Failures of Contingent Thinking," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt5q14p1np, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D91 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:16:y:2024:i:2:p:236-66. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Michael P. Albert (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/aeaaaea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.