IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/aejmic/v14y2022i3p35-75.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Political Competition with Endogenous Party Formation and Citizen Activists

Author

Listed:
  • Emanuel Hansen

Abstract

This paper studies the effects of endogenous party formation on political platforms. It develops a model in which parties allow like-minded citizens to, first, share the cost of running in a public election and, second, coordinate on a policy platform. The paper characterizes the set of political equilibria with two competing parties and with one uncontested party. In two-party equilibria, the distance between both platforms is always positive but limited, in contrast to the median voter model and the citizen candidate model. In one-party equilibria, the median voter can be worse off than in all equilibria with two competing parties.

Suggested Citation

  • Emanuel Hansen, 2022. "Political Competition with Endogenous Party Formation and Citizen Activists," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 14(3), pages 35-75, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:14:y:2022:i:3:p:35-75
    DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200041
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.aeaweb.org/doi/10.1257/mic.20200041
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://www.aeaweb.org/doi/10.1257/mic.20200041.appx
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://www.aeaweb.org/doi/10.1257/mic.20200041.ds
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to AEA members and institutional subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1257/mic.20200041?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:14:y:2022:i:3:p:35-75. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Michael P. Albert (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/aeaaaea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.