IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/aecrev/v116y2026i5p1648-81.html

Social Preferences over Ordinal Outcomes

Author

Listed:
  • Sandro Ambuehl
  • B. Douglas Bernheim

Abstract

We study social preferences in settings where someone who chooses on behalf of others knows how those individuals rank the available options but may lack cardinal information concerning those comparisons. Contrary to majoritarian principles, most people place more weight on preventing least preferred outcomes for others than on enabling most preferred outcomes. Ranks matter both intrinsically and because they provide a basis for inferring cardinal utility. Ordinal aggregation principles are stable across domains and countries with divergent political traditions. Designing attractive social choice mechanisms is challenging in practice partly because aggregation principles that make manipulation difficult yield outcomes people consider normatively unappealing.

Suggested Citation

  • Sandro Ambuehl & B. Douglas Bernheim, 2026. "Social Preferences over Ordinal Outcomes," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 116(5), pages 1648-1681, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:116:y:2026:i:5:p:1648-81
    DOI: 10.1257/aer.20211491
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.aeaweb.org/doi/10.1257/aer.20211491
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to AEA members and institutional subscribers.
    File URL: https://www.aeaweb.org/articles/materials/25082
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://www.aeaweb.org/articles/materials/25083
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1257/aer.20211491?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to

    for a different version of it.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:116:y:2026:i:5:p:1648-81. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Michael P. Albert (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/aeaaaea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.